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Siddharth Barman∗ Arpita Biswas†
Abstract
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods, among agents, under car-
dinality constraints and additive valuations. In this setting, we are given a partition of the
entire set of goods—i.e., the goods are categorized—and a limit is specified on the number of
goods that can be allocated from each category to any agent. The objective here is to find a
fair allocation in which the subset of goods assigned to any agent satisfies the given cardinality
constraints. This problem naturally captures a number of resource-allocation applications, and
is a generalization of the well-studied (unconstrained) fair division problem.
The two central notions of fairness, in the context of fair division of indivisible goods, are
envy freeness up to one good (EF1) and the (approximate) maximin share guarantee (MMS). We
show that the existence and algorithmic guarantees established for these solution concepts
in the unconstrained setting can essentially be achieved under cardinality constraints. Specifi-
cally, we develop efficient algorithms which compute EF1 and approximatelyMMS allocations
in the constrained setting.
Furthermore, focusing on the case wherein all the agents have the same additive valuation,
we establish that EF1 allocations exist and can be computed efficiently even under matroid
constraints.
1 Introduction
A large body of recent work in algorithmic game theory, artificial intelligence, and computational
social choice has been directed towards understanding the problem of allocating indivisible goods
among agents in “fair” manner; see, e.g., [BCE+16] and [End17] for excellent expositions. This
recent focus on indivisible goods is motivated, in part, by applications (such as division of inheri-
tance and partitioning computational resources in a cloud computing environment) which inher-
ently entail allocation of goods/resources that cannot be fractionally allocated. In fact, algorithms
developed for finding fair allocations of indivisible goods have been implemented in specific set-
tings; for instance, Course Match [BCKO16] is employed for course allocation at the Wharton
School in the University of Pennsylvania and the website Spliddit (www.spliddit.org) [GP14]
provides free, online access to fair division algorithms.
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Note that, though the theory of fair division is extensive, classical notions of fairness—such as
envy freeness1—typically address allocation of divisible goods (i.e., goods which can be fractionally
allocated) and are not representative in the indivisible setting. For instance, while an envy-free
allocation of divisible goods is guaranteed to exist [Str80], such an existence result does not hold
for indivisible goods.2
Motivated by these considerations, recent results have formulated and studied solution con-
cepts to address fair division of indivisible goods [Bud11, PW14, BL14]. Arguably, the two most
prominent notions of fairness in this context are (i) envy freeness up to one good (EF1) and (ii) the
maximin share guarantee (MMS). These solution concepts were defined by Budish [Bud11] and
they, respectively, provide a cogent analogue of envy-freeness and proportionality3 in the context
of indivisible goods:
(i) An allocation is said to be EF1 if every agent values her bundle at least as much as any other
agent’s bundle, up to the removal of the most valuable good from the other agent’s bundle.
EF1 allocations are guaranteed to exist; by contrast, for indivisible goods envy-free alloca-
tions might not exist. Another attractive feature of EF1 is that it is computationally tractable:
even under combinatorial valuations, EF1 allocations can be found efficiently [LMMS04].
Furthermore, under additive valuations, this notion of fairness is compatible with Pareto
efficiency [CKM+16].
(ii) An allocation is said to satisfy MMS if each agent receives a bundle of value at least as
much as her maximin share. These shares provide an agent-specific fairness threshold, and
are defined as the maximum value that an agent can guarantee for herself if she were to
partition the set of goods into n bundles and then, from those bundles, receive the minimum
valued one; here, n is the total number of agents. That is, maximin share can be interpreted
via an application of the standard cut-and-choose protocol over indivisible goods: if agent
i is (hypothetically) asked to partition the set of goods into n bundles and the remaining
(n − 1) agents were to select their bundles before i, then a risk-averse agent would find a
partition which maximizes the least valued bundle. Overall, this value that the agent i can
guarantee for herself is called the maximin share of i. Even thoughMMS allocations are not
guaranteed to exist [PW14,KPW16], this notion admits efficient approximation guarantees.
Specifically, under additive valuations, there exist polynomial-time algorithms for finding
allocations wherein each agent receives a bundle of value at least 2/3 times her maximin
share [PW14,AMNS15,BK17].4 Note that these results establish an absolute guarantee, i.e.,
they show that an approximately maximin fair allocation always exists.
The existence and computational results developed for EF1 andMMS provide a sound under-
standing of fair division of indivisible goods. However, it is relevant to note that the vast majority
1An allocation is said to be envy-free if each agent values her bundle at least as much as she values any other agent’s
bundle [Fol67,Var74].
2If we have a single indivisible good and two agents, then in any allocation, the losing agent is bound to be envious.
3An allocation is said to be proportionally fair among n agents, if every agent gets a bundle of value at least 1/n
times her value for the entire set of goods.
4For additive valuations, Ghodsi et al. [GHS+17] provide an improved approximation guarantee of 3/4.
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of work in this thread of research is solely focussed on the unconstrained version of the problem.5
To address this limitation, and motivated by the fact that in many real-world settings the alloca-
tions are required to satisfy certain criteria, we study a relevant, constrained version of the fair
division problem.
In particular, we consider a setting wherein the indivisible goods are categorized (i.e., we are
given a partition of the set of goods) and a limit is specified on the number of goods that can be
allocated from each category to any agent. Here, the objective is to find a fair allocation in which
the subset of goods assigned to any agent satisfies the given cardinality constraints. We shall see
that this corresponds to a fair allocation problem under a partition matroid constraint.
The following stylized example—adapted from [GMT14]—demonstrates the applicability of
such constraints: A museum decides to open new branches, and thereby needs to transfer some
of the exhibits from the main museum to the newly opened ones. The exhibits are categorized
into, say, statues, paintings, and pottery. In addition, there is an upper limit on the number of ex-
hibits that every newly opened branch can accommodate from each category. The question now
is to find a feasible division of the exhibits which is fair to the curators of each of the new branches.
Our Contributions: We show that the existence and algorithmic guarantees established for EF1
andMMS allocations in the unconstrained setting can, in fact, be achieved under cardinality con-
straints as well. Specifically, we establish the following results under additive valuations and
cardinality (partition matroid) constraints:
1. EF1 allocations are guaranteed to exist. In particular, we develop a combinatorial algorithm
which, for a given fair division instance with additive valuations and cardinality constraints,
finds an EF1 allocation in polynomial time (Theorem 1).
2. In this constrained setting, a constant-factor approximateMMS allocation always exists and
can be computed in polynomial time (Theorem 2). Note that, in this setting, the value of the
maximin share of each of the n agents is obtained by considering only feasible allocations
(see Equation (1) in Section 2). That is, here, the maximin share of an agent is defined to be
maximum value that she can guarantee for herself if she were to partition the set of goods
into n bundles, each of which must satisfy the cardinality constraints, and from them receive
the minimum valued one.
3. We also consider fair division subject to matroid constraints (Section 7) and show that if the
agents have identical, additive valuations, then again an EF1 allocation is guaranteed to
exist (Theorem 3) and can be computed efficiently (Theorem 4).
4. Specific extensions of EF1—in particular, envy-free up to the least valued good (EFX)6 and envy-
free up to one least-preferred good (EFL)7—are not guaranteed to exist under cardinality con-
5The work of Bouveret et al. [BCE+17] along with [GM17] and [GMT14] are notable exceptions. These results are
discussed in Section 1.1.
6An allocation is said to be envy-free up to the least valued good (EFX) if no agent envies any other agent after
removing any positively valued good from the other agent’s bundle [CKM+16].
7See Section 5 for a definition.
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straints. In Section 5 we provide a (constrained) fair division instance which does not admit
an EFX or an EFL allocation.
1.1 Related Work
The fairness notions of EF1 and MMS were defined by Budish [Bud11] (see also [Mou90]), and
these solution concepts have been extensively studied since then. The existence of EF1 allocations
can be established via the cycle-elimination algorithm of Lipton et al. [LMMS04]. Caragiannis et
al. [CKM+16] have shown that these two solution concepts are incomparable, i.e., one does not
imply the other.
Fair division instances wherein the agents’ valuations are binary and additive always ad-
mit MMS allocations [BL14]. However, Procaccia and Wang [PW14] along with Kurokawa et
al. [KPW16] provided intricate counterexamples to refute the universal existence of MMS allo-
cations, even under additive valuations. This lead to a study of approximate maximin share al-
locations, α-MMS, where each agent receives a bundle whose value to her is at least α ∈ (0, 1)
times her maximin share. Procaccia and Wang [PW14] developed an efficient algorithm to obtain
a 2/3-MMS allocation when the number of agents is constant. Later, Amanatidis et al. [AMNS15]
established that a 2/3-MMS allocation can be computed in polynomial (even in the number of
players) time.
More recently, constant-factor approximation guarantees forMMS in settings wherein the val-
uations are not necessarily additive have been established in [BK17] and [GHS+17]. Specifically,
for submodular valuations Ghodsi et al. [GHS+17] have developed an efficient algorithm for com-
puting 1/3-MMS allocations.
As mentioned previously, the work on fair division of indivisible goods is primarily confined
to the unconstrained setting. Exceptions include thework of Bouveret et al. [BCE+17] and Ferraioli
et al. [FGM14]. Bouveret et al. [BCE+17] consider fair division of goods which correspond to
vertices of a given graph, and the problem is to fairly allocate a connected subgraph to each agent.
It is shown in [BCE+17] that MMS allocations might not exist for general graphs; however, it can
be efficiently computed when the underlying graph is a tree.
Ferraioli et al. [FGM14] consider fair division problems where each agent must receive exactly
k goods, for a given integer k, and provide an algorithm to efficiently compute a 1/k-approximate
MMS allocation. A different kind of matroid constraint is considered in [GM17] and [GMT14].
In particular, the problem formulation in [GM17] and [GMT14] requires that the union of all the
allocated goods is an independent set of a given matroid. This setup is incomparable to the one
considered in this paper. Specifically, while we ensure that in the computed fair allocation each
agent’s bundle satisfies the partition matroid constraint and all the goods are allocated, these
requirements are not imposed in [GM17] and [GMT14].
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2 Notation and Preliminaries
An instance of the fair division problem comprises of a tuple
〈
[m], [n], (vi)i∈[n]
〉
, where [m] =
{1, 2, . . . ,m} denotes the set of indivisible goods, [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the set of agents, and
vis specify the valuation (preferences) of the agents, i ∈ [n], over the set of goods. Throughout, we
will assume that, for each agent i, the valuation vi : 2
[m] 7→ R+ is additive, i.e., for all agents i ∈ [n]
and subsets S ⊆ [m], vi(S) =
∑
g∈S vi ({g}). Also, we have vi ({g}) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n] and g ∈ [m].
For ease of notation, we will use vi(g), instead of vi({g}), to denote the valuation of agent i for a
good g.
Write Πt(S) to denote the set of all t-partitions of a subset of goods S ⊆ [m]. An allocation, A,
refers to an n-partition A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) ∈ Πn([m]), where Ai is the subset of goods (bundle)
allocated to agent i. In this work we focus on finding fair allocations which satisfy given cardi-
nality constraints. Specifically, we are given a partition of the set of goods consisting of ℓ different
“categories” {C1, C2, . . . , Cℓ}, and associated with each category h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ} we have a (car-
dinality) threshold kh. In this setup, an allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) is said to be feasible iff, for
every bundle Ai and category h, the cardinality constraint holds: |Ai ∩ Ch| ≤ kh. Throughout, we
will use F to denote the set of feasible allocations, F := {A ∈ Πn([m]) | |Ai ∩ Ch| ≤ kh for all i ∈
[n] and h ∈ [ℓ]}. To ensure that F is nonempty, we require that the threshold kh ≥
|Ch|
n for all
categories h ∈ [ℓ].
We will use
〈
[m], [n], (vi)i∈[n],F
〉
to denote an instance of the fair division problem subject to
cardinality constraints. Overall, our goal is to find fair allocations contained in F .8 In this work,
we provide existential and algorithmic results for the following fairness notions:
• Envy-free up to one good (EF1): In a fair division instance
〈
[m], [n], (vi)i∈[n],F
〉
, an allocation
A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) ∈ F is said to be EF1 iff for every pair of agents i, j ∈ [n] there exists a
good g ∈ Aj such that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g}).
• Maximin Share Guarantee (MMS): Given an instance
〈
[m], [n], (vi)i∈[n],F
〉
, the (constrained)
maximin share of agent i is defined as
CMMSi := max
(P1,...,Pn)∈F
min
j∈[n]
vi(Pj). (1)
An allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) ∈ F is said satisfy MMS iff for all agents i ∈ [n], we have
vi(Ai) ≥ CMMSi. Since MMS allocations are not guaranteed to exist, the objective is to
find feasible allocations (A1, . . . , An) ∈ F wherein each agent gets a bundle of value at least
α ∈ (0, 1] times CMMSi; with factor α being as large as possible. We call such allocations
α-MMS.
3 Main Results
The key results established in this paper are:
8Note that the set F might be exponential in size, but it is specified in an efficient manner via the partition
{C1, C2, . . . , Cℓ} and thresholds kh. Setting ℓ=1, C1=[m], k1=m, we get F=Πn([m]). Hence, this formulation is a strict
generalization of the unconstrained fair division problem.
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Theorem 1. Given any fair division instance
〈
[m], [n], (vi)i∈[n],F
〉
with additive valuations and cardi-
nality constraints (F 6= ∅), there exists a polynomial time algorithm for finding a feasible EF1 allocation.
This theorem is established in Section 4 and it implies that as long as the set of feasible alloca-
tions F is nonempty it admits an EF1 (i.e., a fair) allocation.
Theorem 2. Given any fair division instance
〈
[m], [n], (vi)i∈[n],F
〉
with cardinality constraints (F 6= ∅)
and additive valuations, a 1/3-MMS allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
Analogous to the EF1 case, this theorem provides an absolute, existence guarantee for approx-
imate maximin fair allocations under cardinality constraints. A proof of this result appears in
Section 6.
We also establish that when the valuations are identical, then EF1 allocations exist and are
efficiently computable even undermatroid constraints; see Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 in Section 7.
4 EF1 Allocations Under Cardinality Constraints: Proof of Theorem 1
In the unconstrained setting, there exist efficient algorithms for finding EF1 allocations; see, e.g.,
the cycle-elimination algorithm of Lipton et al. [LMMS04] and the round-robin method by Cara-
giannis et al. [CKM+16]. However, the allocations found by these algorithms are not guaranteed
to satisfy the given cardinality constraints. We bypass this issue by developing a polynomial-time
algorithm, ALG 1, for finding an allocation A which is not only EF1, but also feasible, i.e., A ∈ F .
Algorithm 1 ALG 1
Input : A fair division instance 〈[m], [n], (vi)i,F〉 with additive valuations and cardinality con-
straints.
Output: A feasible EF1 allocation
1: Initialize allocation A0 = (A01, . . . , A
0
n)with A
0
i ← ∅ for each agent i ∈ [n].
2: Fix an (arbitrary) ordering of the agents σ = (σ(1), σ(2), . . . , σ(n))
3: for h = 1 to ℓ do
4: Bh ←Greedy-Round-Robin(Ch, [n], (vi)i, σ).
5: Set Ahi ← A
h−1
i ∪B
h
i for all i ∈ [n].
6: Using Lemma 1, updateAh = (Ah1 , . . . , A
h
n) to obtain an acyclic envy graph G(A
h).
7: Update σ to be a topological ordering of G(Ah).
8: end for
9: ReturnAℓ.
ALG 1 is based on an interesting modification of the round-robin algorithm: initially, ALG 1
selects an arbitrary order (permutation) over the agents σ := (σ(1), . . . , σ(n)). It then picks an
unallocated category h and executes the Greedy-Round-Robin algorithm (ALG 2) with the n agents,
|Ch| goods (from category Ch), and the selected order σ.
ALG 2 follows the ordering σ in a round-robin fashion (i.e., it selects agents, one after the other,
from σ(1) to σ(n)), and iteratively assigns to the selected agent an unallocated good from Ch that
she desires the most. Finally, it returns an allocation Bh ∈ Πn(Ch).
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After allocating all the goods of a category h, Step 6 of ALG 1 creates an envy graph9 G(Ah).
It was established in [LMMS04] that one can always efficiently update a given partial allocation
such that the resulting envy graph is acyclic:
Lemma 1. [LMMS04] Given a partial allocation (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn(S) of a subset of goods S, we can
find another partial allocation B=(B1, . . . , Bn) ∈ Πn(S) of S in polynomial time such that
(i) The valuations of the agents for their bundles do not decrease: vi(Bi) ≥ vi(Ai) for all i ∈ [n].
(ii) The envy graph G(B) is acyclic.
Algorithm 2 Greedy-Round-Robin (ALG 2)
Input : An instance 〈C, [n], (vi)i〉with additive valuations and an ordering σ of [n].
Output: An allocation of the given |C| goods among n agents
1: Initialize bundle Bi ← ∅, for each agent i ∈ [n], the set of unallocated goods M ← C , and
t← 0.
2: while M 6= ∅ do
3: t← t+ 1.
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: Set gtσ(i) ∈ argmaxg∈M vσ(i)(g)
6: Update Bσ(i) ← Bσ(i) ∪ {g
t
σ(i)}
7: UpdateM ←M \ {gtσ(i)}.
8: if M == ∅ then
9: break;
10: end if
11: end for
12: end while
13: Return B = (B1, . . . , Bn).
Finally, σ is updated to be a topological ordering of the acyclic directed graph G(Ah). This new
ordering is then used for the next category of goods.
The feasibility of the computed allocation, Aℓ, directly follows from the fact that (for each
h ∈ [ℓ]) ALG 2 distributes the |Ch| goods evenly among n agents. In particular, the round-robin
nature of ALG 2 ensures that, Bhi , the set of goods allocated to agent i from category h satisfies:
10
|Bhi | ≤
⌈
|Ch|
n
⌉
≤ kh.
In Lemma 2 we show that, for each h ∈ [ℓ], the partial allocation obtained after the allocating
the first h categories, Ah, is EF1. Since Algorithm 1 allocates all them goods we get that the final
allocation, Aℓ, is in fact EF1 as well.
This, along with the observation that ALG 1 runs in polynomial time completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
9An envy graph, for an allocation A, is a directed graph that captures the envy between agents in A. Specifically,
the nodes in the envy graph represent the agents and it contains a directed edge from i to j iff i envies j, i.e., iff
vi(Ai) < vi(Aj).
10Recall that the underlying feasible set of allocations F is nonempty iff the integer limit kh ≥
|Ch|
n
.
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Next, we establish a proposition which will be used in the proof of Lemma 2.
Proposition 1. Given any fair division instance 〈C, [n], (vi)i〉 with additive valuations and an ordering of
agents σ, the allocation B = (B1, . . . , Bn) obtained by ALG 2 satisfies the following properties:
(1) For any two indices i < j, the agent σ(i) does not envy agent σ(j), i.e., vσ(i)(Bσ(i)) ≥ vσ(i)(Bσ(j)).
(2) B is EF1.
Proof. Write T := ⌈ |C|n ⌉ to denote the total number of rounds of ALG 2. In each round, for i < j,
agent σ(i) gets to choose her most desired good among the unallocated goods before agent σ(j).
Hence, if gtσ(i) and g
t
σ(j) denote the good assigned to agent σ(i) and σ(j), respectively, in the tth
round, then vσ(i)(g
t
σ(i)) ≥ vσ(i)(g
t
σ(j)) for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. Since the valuations are additive, the
stated property holds: vσ(i)(Bσ(i)) ≥ vσ(i)(Bσ(j)).
It is known that the round-robin algorithm results in an EF1 allocation [CKM+16], we repeat
the argument for completeness: If index i is less than j, then agent σ(i) does not envy agent σ(j).
On the other hand, even if i > j the good allocated to agent σ(i) in the tth round is of value (under
vσ(i)) no less than the good allocated to agent σ(j) in the (t+ 1)th round: vσ(i)(g
t
σ(i)) ≥ vσ(i)(g
t+1
σ(j))
for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. Summing we get,
∑T−1
t=1 vσ(i)(g
t
σ(i)) ≥ vσ(i)(Bσ(j))− vσ(i)(g
1
σ(j)). Thus, the
allocation B is EF1.
Lemma 2. ALG 1 returns an EF1 allocation.
Proof. We will show inductively that, for each h ∈ [ℓ], the partial allocation obtained after allocat-
ing the first h categories,Ah, is EF1. Hence, the returned allocation, Aℓ is EF1 as well.
Here, the base case (h = 1) follows from Proposition 1; since A1 = B1 and the proposition
ensures that B1 is EF1.
By the induction hypothesis we have that Ah is EF1 and, by construction, the corresponding
envy graph G(Ah) is acyclic. Next, we will show that this continues to hold for the next category
h + 1. Note that the ordering of agents for (executing ALG 2 over) the category Ch+1 is obtained
by topologically sorting G(Ah). Let π be that topological ordering and write π−1(a) as the index
of agent a according to the ordering π.
Now, if agent a envies b in Ah, then there is a directed edge from a to b in G(Ah) and, hence,
π−1(a) < π−1(b). In this case, Proposition 1 ensures that a does not envy b in Bh+1, i.e., we have
va(B
h+1
a ) ≥ va(B
h+1
b ). The fact that A
h is EF1 gives us va(A
h
a) ≥ va(A
h
b )− va(g), for some g ∈ A
h
b .
Summing the last two inequalities and noting that Ah+1a = A
h
a ∪ B
h+1
a and A
h+1
b = A
h
b ∪ B
h+1
b we
get that Ah+1 is EF1with respect to agent a and b.
The complementary case wherein a does not envy b in Ah is analogous, since Bh+1 is guar-
anteed to be EF1 in itself. Overall, this establishes the stated claim, that the final allocation Aℓ is
EF1.
Lemma 2 alongwith the feasibility argument mentioned above (and the direct observation that
ALG 1 runs in polynomial time) proves Theorem 1, which we restate below.
Theorem 1. Given any fair division instance
〈
[m], [n], (vi)i∈[n],F
〉
with additive valuations and cardi-
nality constraints (F 6= ∅), there exists a polynomial time algorithm for finding a feasible EF1 allocation.
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5 Non-Existence of EFX and EFL Allocations Under Cardinality Con-
straints
This section considers comparative notions of fairness which are stronger than EF1. In particular,
we show that allocations which satisfy envy-freeness up to the least valued good (EFX) are not guar-
anteed to exist under cardinality constraints.11 The non-existence result also holds for envy-free up
to one less-preferred good (EFL) allocations; defined in [BBKN18], this solution concept is weaker
than EFX, but stronger than EF1. Formally,
• Envy-free up to the least valued good (EFX) [CKM+16]: An allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An)
is said to be EFX iff for every pair of agents i, j ∈ [n] and for all goods g ∈ Aj ∩ {g
′ ∈
[m] | vi(g
′) > 0} (i.e., for all goods g in Aj which are positively valued by agent i) we have
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g}).
• Envy-free up to one less-preferred good (EFL) [BBKN18]: An allocationA = (A1, A2, . . . , An)
is said to be EFL iff for every pair of agents i, j ∈ [n] at least one of the following conditions
hold:
– Aj contains at most one good which is positively valued by i, i.e., |Aj ∩ {g
′ | vi(g
′) >
0}| ≤ 1
– There exists a good g ∈ Aj such that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g}) and vi(Ai) ≥ vi({g}).
Note that, by definition, an EFX allocation is necessarily EFL and, similarly, an EFL allocation
is always EF1.
The universal existence of EFL allocations in unconstrained fair division instances (with addi-
tive valuations) was established in [BBKN18]. By contrast, the following example shows that, un-
der cardinality constrains, EFL allocations do not always exist. This also implies the non-existence
of EFX under cardinality constraints.
Example 1. Consider an instance with 2 agents and 4 goods. Here, the bundle of each agent is constrained
to contain at most 2 goods. That is, we have a (uniform matroid) single category C1, which contains all the
goods, and the threshold k1 = 2.
The valuations of both the agents are identical and as follows: v(g1) = 50 and v(g2) = v(g3) =
v(g4) = 1. In this example, no feasible allocation will ensure EFL.
In this example any feasible allocation will allocate exactly two goods to each agent. Therefore,
one of the agents, say a1, will receive a bundle of value 51 (containing the high-valued good g1
and a low-valued good), while the other agent, a2, will receive a bundle of value 2 (containing
two low-valued goods). Since agent a2 envies a1, EFL can be ensured only if there exists a good of
value at most 2 in a1’s bundle which, when removed, eliminates a2’s envy. However, such a good
does not exist in a1’s bundle and, hence, no feasible allocation is EFL.
11It is relevant to note that the existence of EFX allocations in unconstrained, fair division instances (with additive
valuations) remains an interesting, open question [CKM+16].
9
6 MMS Under Cardinality Constraints: Proof of Theorem 2
To obtain an α-approximate maximin share allocation (α-MMS) under cardinality constraints we
define a nonnegative, monotone, submodular function Fi(·), for each agent i ∈ [n], which satisfies
max
(P1,...,Pn)∈F
min
j∈[n]
vi(Pj) = max
(P1,...,Pn)∈Πn([m])
min
j∈[n]
Fi(Pj).
Hence, a fair division problem under additive valuations and cardinality constraints reduces to
an unconstrained fair division problem under monotone, submodular valuations (Fi)i. Recall
that a function Fi(·) is said to be monotone and submodular iff for all subsets A ⊆ B ⊆ [m] and
g ∈ [m] \B, we have F (A) ≤ F (B) and F (A ∪ {g}) − F (A) ≥ F (B ∪ {g}) − F (B).
We define the function Fi(·) : 2
[m] → R as follows Fi(S) :=
∑
h∈[ℓ]
fhi (S) where,
fhi (S) :=


∑
g∈S∩Ch
vi(g), if |S ∩Ch| ≤ kh
∑
g∈Top
kh
i (S∩Ch)
vi(g), otherwise
Here, Topki (T ) denotes the set of the k most valued (by agent i) goods contained in T . The
following lemma asserts that Fis are submodular.
Lemma 3. For each agent i ∈ [n] the function Fi(·) (defined above) is monotone, nonnegative, and sub-
modular.
Proof. Since, for each agent i ∈ [n], the valuation vi(·) is nonnegative, the function Fi(·) is nonneg-
ative as well. Furthermore, for any agent i ∈ [n] and category h ∈ [ℓ], the function fhi is monotone;
it either increases or remains constant after a good g ∈ [m] is included in any bundle S. Hence,
Fi(·) is monotone.
Next, we will show that for any agent i ∈ [n] the function Fi is submodular, i.e., it satisfies the
following inequality, for any two subsets S ⊆ T ⊂ [m] and good g /∈ T .
Fi(S ∪ {g}) − Fi(S) ≥ Fi(T ∪ {g}) − Fi(T ). (2)
Write h to denote the category of the good g, i.e., g ∈ Ch \ T . Since including g in the subsets
only effects the value of fhi , we have Fi(S ∪ {g})−Fi(S) = f
h
i (S ∪ {g})− f
h
i (S) and Fi(T ∪ {g})−
Fi(T ) = f
h
i (T ∪ {g}) − f
h
i (T ).
Note that if |T ∩Ch| < kh, then we have f
h
i (S∪{g})−f
h
i (S) = vi(g) and f
h
i (T ∪{g})−f
h
i (T ) =
vi(g). Therefore, if the cardinality of T ∩ Ch is strictly less that kh, then the inequality (2) is in fact
tight. Otherwise, if |T ∩ Ch| ≥ kh, then we have the following two cases
Case 1: g /∈ Topkhi ((T ∪ {g}) ∩ Ch). Here, we have f
h
i (T ∪ {g}) = f
h
i (T ). Furthermore, the
monotonicity of function fhi (·) ensures that f
h
i (S∪{g})−f
h
i (S) ≥ 0. Therefore, inequality (2)
holds.
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Case 2: g ∈ Topkhi ((T ∪ {g}) ∩ Ch). In this case, f
h
i (T ∪ {g}) − f
h
i (T ) = vi(g) − vi(g
′), where
g′ ∈ argmin
gˆ∈Top
kh
i (T∩Ch)
vi(gˆ).
• Now, if |S ∩ Ch| < kh, then f
h
i (S ∪ {g}) − f
h
i (S) = vi(g) ≥ vi(g) − vi(g
′) and, hence,
inequality (2) holds.
• Otherwise, if |S ∩ Ch| ≥ kh, we have f
h
i (S ∪ {g}) − f
h
i (S) = vi(g) − vi(g
′′), where
g′′ ∈ argmin
gˆ∈Top
kh
i (S∩Ch)
vi(gˆ). Since S ⊆ T , we have min
gˆ∈Top
kh
i (T∩Ch)
vi(gˆ) ≤ min
gˆ∈Top
kh
i (S∩Ch)
vi(gˆ).
That is, vi(g
′) ≤ vi(g
′′) and, again, inequality (2) is satisfied.
Recall that the set of feasible allocations F is nonempty if and only if the cardinality thresholds
kh ≥
|Ch|
n for all categories h ∈ [ℓ]. Assuming nonempty set of feasible allocations, we now
establish that the maximin value over all feasible allocations using valuations vi(·) is equivalent to
the maximin value over all possible [n]-partitions of [m] using the function Fi(·).
Lemma 4. If for all the categories h ∈ [ℓ], the cardinality threshold satisfies kh ≥
|Ch|
n (i.e., if the set of
feasible allocations F is nonempty), then the following equality holds for each agent i ∈ [n]:
max
(P1,...,Pn)∈F
min
j∈[n]
vi(Pj) = max
(P1,...,Pn)∈Πn([m])
min
j∈[n]
Fi(Pj)
Proof. We fix an agent i ∈ [n] and first show that the left-hand side of the stated equality is up-
per bounded by the right-hand side. Write (A∗1, . . . , A
∗
n) ∈ argmax(P1,...,Pn)∈F minj∈[n] vi(Pj).
Since |A∗j ∩ Ch| ≤ kh for all h and j, we have Fi(A
∗
j ) = vi(A
∗
j ) for all j. Now, the inequality
minj∈[n]Fi(A
∗
j ) ≤ max(P1,...,Pn)∈Πn([m]) minj∈[n] Fi(Pj) establishes the upper bound.
We complete the proof by showing that an inequality holds in the other direction as well. Write
(B∗1 , . . . , B
∗
n) ∈ argmax(P1,...,Pn)∈Πn([m]) minj∈[n] Fi(Pj). Say (B
∗
1 , . . . , B
∗
n) /∈ F , then there exists an
index b ∈ [n] and h ∈ [ℓ] such that |B∗b ∩Ch| > kh. Since kh ≥
|Ch|
n , an averaging argument implies
that there exists another index a ∈ [n] for which |B∗a ∩ Ch| < kh. Now, consider the lowest valued
(by agent i) good g ∈ B∗b ∩Ch. Note that Fi(B
∗
b ) = Fi(B
∗
b \{g}) and Fi(B
∗
a ∪{g}) ≥ Fi(B
∗
a). Hence,
we can iteratively perform such swaps till all the cardinality constraints are satisfied. That is, we
can obtain an allocation, say B′ = (B′1, . . . , B
′
n) ∈ F , which is feasible and satisfiesFi(B
′
j) ≥ Fi(B
∗
j )
for all j ∈ [n]. The feasibility of B′ ensures that the following equality holds for all j: Fi(B
′
j) =
vi(B
′
j). Therefore, minj∈[n] Fi(B
′
j) = minj∈[n] vi(B
′
j) ≤ max(P1,...,Pn)∈F minj∈[n] vi(Pj). Hence, the
left-hand side of the equality stated in the lemma is at least as much as the right-hand side.
Under submodular valuations a 1/3-MMS allocation can be computed efficiently in the un-
constrained setting [GHS+17]. Therefore, for an unconstrained fair division instance over the m
goods and with submodular valuations of the n agents as (Fi)i, we can, in polynomial time, find
an allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn([m])which is 1/3-MMS. Employing a swap argument— sim-
ilar to the one used in the proof of Lemma 4—we can efficiently convertA into a feasible allocation
B ∈ F which satisfies Fi(Bi) ≥ Fi(Ai), for all i ∈ [n]. That is, for the unconstrained instance, B is
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a 1/3-MMS allocation as well. In addition, the feasibility of B implies that Fi(Bi) = vi(Bi), for all
i. Overall, via Lemma 4 (i.e., the fact that the maximin shares of each agent i in the constructed
unconstrained instance is equal to the underlying CMMSi value), we get that B is a feasible, 1/3-
MMS allocation for the constrained instance. This completes the proof of Theorem 2, which is
restated below.
Theorem 2. Given any fair division instance
〈
[m], [n], (vi)i∈[n],F
〉
with cardinality constraints (F 6= ∅)
and additive valuations, a 1/3-MMS allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
7 Identical Valuations and Matroid Constraint
This section shows that if the additive valuations of the agents are identical (i.e., vi = vj for all
i, j ∈ [n]), then an EF1 allocation is guaranteed to exist even under a matroid constraint.
Matroids have been studied extensively inmathematics and computer science; see, e.g. [Oxl92].
These structures provide an encompassing framework for representing combinatorial constraints;
in particular, the cardinality constraints considered in the previous sections correspond to a par-
ticular matroid, called the partition matroid. Formally, amatroid is defined as a pair ([m],I)where
[m] is the ground set of elements and I—referred to as independent sets—is a nonempty collection
of subsets of [m] that satisfies: (i) Hereditary property: If B ∈ I and A ⊂ B, then A ∈ I , and (ii)
Independent Set Exchange: If A,B ∈ I and |A| < |B|, then there exist an element x ∈ B \ A such
that A ∪ {x} ∈ I .
We consider a fair division instance 〈[m], [n], (vi)i∈[n],M〉whereM denotes the set of all alloca-
tions which satisfy the underlying matroid constraint, i.e., allocations whose constituent bundles
are independent,M := {A = (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn([m]) | Ai ∈ I for all i ∈ [n]}. The main result of
this section is as follows
Theorem 3. Every fair division instance
〈
[m], [n], (vi)i∈[n],M
〉
under additive, identical valuations and
matroid constraint,M 6= ∅ , admits an EF1 allocation.
Proof. We establish the result by showing that an allocation which maximizes the Nash Social Wel-
fare over the setM is necessarily EF1. For an allocation A = (A1, . . . , An), the Nash Social Welfare
(NSW) is defined as the geometric mean of the agents’ valuations, NSW(A) := (
∏
i∈[n] vi(Ai))
1/n.
Let v(·) denote identical, additive valuations of the agents. We assume v(g) > 0 for all g ∈ [m]
and consider an optimal allocation A ∈ argmax
B∈M
NSW(B), which satisfies NSW(A) > 0.12 We will
prove that A is EF1. Since A ∈M, the stated claim follows.
Say, for contradiction, that A is not an EF1 allocation, then we will show that there exists
another allocation A′ ∈ M along with agents i and j, such that A′h = Ah, for all other agents
h ∈ [n] \ {i, j}, and min{v(A′i), v(A
′
j)} > min{v(Ai), v(Aj)}. The last inequality and the fact that
v(A′i) + v(A
′
j) = v(Ai) + v(Aj) imply v(A
′
i) · v(A
′
j) > v(Ai) · v(Aj). Therefore, we get NSW(A
′) >
NSW(A), which contradicts the optimality ofA.
12If the optimal NSW overM is zero, then it must be the case that we have less than n goods. For such an instance,
an allocation wherein each agent gets at most one good is both feasible and EF1.
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By definition, if A is not EF1, then there exists a pair of agents i, j such that
(E) : v(Ai) < v(Aj)− v(g) for all g ∈ Aj.
Note that if there exists a good g in Aj such that Ai ∪ {g} is independent (i.e., Ai ∪ {g} ∈ I),
then swapping g from Aj to Ai gives us the desired allocation A
′ (with a strictly higher NSW than
A). Hence, we analyze the case in which no such good exists. In particular, we have Ai ∪ {g} /∈ I
for all g ∈ Aj . This condition implies that |Ai| ≥ |Aj |; otherwise, the Independent Set Exchange
property of matroids would ensure the existence of a good g ∈ Aj such that Ai ∪ {g} ∈ I .
Write t := |Aj |. The independence of Ai and Aj along with the inequality |Ai| ≥ |Aj | = t
imply that there exist t component-wise distinct pairs of goods {(giz , g
j
z) ∈ (Ai, Aj) | z ∈ [t]}
such that (Ai \ {g
i
z}) ∪ {g
j
z} and (Aj \ {g
j
z}) ∪ {giz} are independent for all z ∈ [t]. This fact is
established in [Goe09] for the case wherein |Ai| = |Aj | = t. Lemma 5 (proved below) complements
this result and guarantees the existence of the relevant t component-wise distinct pairs of goods,
{(giz , g
j
z) ∈ (Ai, Aj) | z ∈ [t]}, even when |Ai| > |Aj|. Next, we will complete the proof of the
theorem using the pairs {(giz , g
j
z) ∈ (Ai, Aj) | z ∈ [t]}.
Since the pairs in {(giz , g
j
z) ∈ (Ai, Aj) | z ∈ [t]} are distinct, {g
j
z | z ∈ [t]} = Aj and {g
i
z | z ∈
[t]} = Aˆi ⊆ Ai. The envy between agent i and j (i.e., v(Aj) > v(Ai) ≥ v(Aˆi)) implies that there
exists index y ∈ [t] for which v(gjy) > v(giy).
Consider the allocation A′ wherein A′i = (Ai \ {g
i
y}) ∪ {g
j
y}, A′j = (Aj \ {g
j
y}) ∪ {giy}, and
A′h = Ah for all other agents. Note that all the bundles in A
′ are independent, A′ ∈ M, and
v(A′i) = v(Ai) + v(g
j
y) − v(giy) > v(Ai). Furthermore, v(A
′
j) = v(Aj) − v(g
j
y) + v(giy) > v(Ai);
the last inequality follows from (E). Hence, min{v(A′i), v(A
′
j)} > v(Ai) = min{v(Ai), v(Aj)},
which implies that the NSW of A′ is higher than that of A. This, by contradiction, completes the
proof.
Lemma 5. Let ([m],I) be a matroid with independent subsets I, J ∈ I which satisfy I ∩ J = ∅ and
|I| ≥ |J |. Then, there exists a one-to-one map µ : J 7→ I such that swapping any j ∈ J with µ(j) ∈ I
leads to independent subsets, i.e., for any element j ∈ J , both (J \ {j}) ∪ {µ(j)} and (I \ {µ(j)}) ∪ {j}
belong to I .
Proof. Using the independent set exchange property of matroids, subset J can be extended to an
independent subset, say J ′, such that |J ′| = |I| and J = J ′ \ I .
It is shown in [Goe09] that for any two independent subsets of the same cardinality, I and J ′,
there exists a bijection µ : J ′ \ I 7→ I \ J ′ which satisfies the required swap property, i.e., for any
j ∈ J ′ \ I , both (J ′ \ {j}) ∪ {µ(j)} and (I \ {µ(j)}) ∪ {j} are independent. Since J is a subset of J ′,
we get that (J \ {j}) ∪ {µ(j)} ∈ I and, hence, the lemma holds.
For completeness, below we provide a proof of the result from [Goe09]. This proof uses the
strong basis exchange lemma (see, e.g., [Oxl92]), which states that, given any two bases B1 and
B2 of a matroid, for all elements b1 ∈ B1 \ B2 there exists an element b2 ∈ B2 \ B1 such that both
(B1 \ {b1}) ∪ {b2}) and (B2 \ {b2}) ∪ {b1} are independent.
Consider the truncated matroid T := ([m], {S ∈ I | |S| ≤ |I|}). Subsets I and J ′ are bases
for the matroid T . Hence, applying the strong basis exchange lemma (SBE), we get that for any
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element j ∈ J ′ \ I there exists an element i ∈ I \ J ′ such that (I \ {i}) ∪ {j} and (J ′ \ {j}) ∪ {i} are
independent (and, hence, bases for T ).
Set µ(j) = i and reapply SBE on bases J ′ and I ′ := (I \{µ(j)})∪{j} with a new element jˆ ∈ J .
This provides us with a swap element iˆ ∈ I ′ \ J ′ such that (J ′ \ {jˆ}) ∪ {ˆi} is basis. Since µ(j) /∈ I ′,
we get iˆ 6= µ(j). Furthermore, the fact that iˆ is contained in I ′ \ J ′ implies iˆ 6= j. Therefore, we can
extend the bijection µ by setting µ(jˆ) = iˆ. Overall, repeatedly applying SBE leads to the desired
one-to-one map µ, and completes the proof.
Next we provide an efficient algorithm for finding an EF1 allocation under identical, additive
valuations and matroid constraints. In particular, Theorem 4 provides a constructive proof of
existence for EF1 allocations in the current setup.
Theorem 4. Given any fair division instance
〈
[m], [n], (vi)i∈[n],M
〉
with additive, identical valuations
and matroid constraint,M 6= ∅, Algorithm 3 finds an EF1 allocation in polynomial time.
Proof. The work of Gabow and Westermann [GW92] provides an efficient algorithm to compute a
partition A = (A1, . . . , An) of them goods such that Ai ∈ I , for all i ∈ [n]. Algorithm 3 starts with
such a partition and then iteratively reallocates goods between the bundles till an EF1 allocation
is obtained. The algorithm maintains the invariant that at any point of time the partition in hand
is in M. That is, throughout the execution of the algorithm the bundles allocated to the agents
remain independent.
Let A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) be a partition considered by the algorithm during its execution and
write ℓ to denote the index of the least valued bundle in A, i.e., ℓ := argmini∈[n] v(Ai). Also, write
V(A) to denote the set of indices of the bundles that violate EF1with respect to the the least valued
bundle Aℓ
V(A) := {i ∈ [n] | v(Ai)− v(g) > v(Aℓ) for all g ∈ Ai}.
Note that allocation A is EF1 iff V(A) = ∅. We will use Ah to denote the highest valued bundle
which violates the EF1 condition with respect to Aℓ, i.e., h := argmaxi∈V(A) v(Ai). By definition
of the the violating set, we have
v(Ah \ {g}) > v(Aℓ) for all g ∈ Ah (3)
Algorithm 3 aims to reallocate good(s) between Ah and Aℓ such that the resulting bundles
remain independent. We will prove (via case analysis) that the intended reallocation is always
possible and it results in either (i) a decrease in the cardinality of Ah by one, or (ii) a drop in the
value of Ah by a multiplicative factor of
(
1− 1
m2
)
.
Case (i): |Aℓ| < |Ah|. Since Aℓ, Ah ∈ I , by the independence set exchange property, there
exists a good g ∈ Ah such that Aℓ ∪ {g} ∈ I . Algorithm 3 transfers such a good g from Ah to
Aℓ, and in this case the cardinality of Ah drops by one.
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Algorithm 3 SWAP (ALG 3)
Input : A fair division instance 〈[m], [n], v(·),M〉 with identical, additive valuation, v(·), along
with an oracle access to the underlying matroid ([m],I).
Output: A feasible EF1 allocation.
1: Initialize partition A = (A1, . . . , An) such that ∪i∈[n]Ai = [m] and Ai ∈ I for all i ∈ [n].
2: Set ℓ = argmin
i∈[n]
v(Ai)
{ℓ is the index of the least valued bundle in A}.
3: Set V = {i ∈ [n] | v(Ai \ {g}) > v(Aℓ) for all g ∈ Ai}.
{V is the set of indices i such that the bundle Ai violates EF1with respect to Aℓ}
4: while V 6= ∅ do
5: Set h = argmax
i∈V
v(Ai)
{h is the index of the highest valued bundle in V}
6: if |Aℓ| < |Ah| then
7: Set g = argmax
e∈Ah:Aℓ∪{e}∈I
v(e)
{By the independent set exchange property of matroids, such a good g is guaranteed to
exist}
8: Update Ah ← Ah \ {g} and Aℓ ← Aℓ ∪ {g}.
9: else
10: Let µ be the map obtained by applying Lemma 5 to independent sets Aℓ and Ah
{Here, |Aℓ| ≥ |Ah| and we have µ : Ah 7→ Aℓ}.
11: Find a good g ∈ Ah such that v(g) − v(µ(g)) ≥
1
m2
v(Ah)
{The existence of such a good is established in Theorem 4}
12: Update Ah ← (Ah \ {g}) ∪ {µ(g)} and Aℓ ← (Aℓ \ {µ(g)}) ∪ {g}.
13: end if
14: Update ℓ← argmin
i∈[n]
v(Ai) and V ← {i ∈ [n] | v(Ai \ {g}) > v(Aℓ) for all g ∈ Ai}.
15: end while
16: ReturnA = (A1, . . . , An).
Case (ii): |Aℓ| ≥ |Ah|. Write t := |Ah| and let Ah = {gz}z∈[t]. Without loss of generality,
assume that the goods in Ah are indexed such that v(g1) ≥ v(g2) ≥ . . . ≥ v(gt). Lemma 5
provides t distinct pair of goods {(gz , µ(gz)) ∈ (Ah, Aℓ) | z ∈ [t]} such that (Ah \ {gz}) ∪
{µ(gz)} and (Aℓ \ {µ(gz)}) ∪ {gz} are independent for all z ∈ [t]. We show that among these
pairs there exists one, (gx, µ(gx)), which satisfies v(gx)− v(µ(gx)) ≥
1
t2
v(Ah).
The fact that Ah and Aℓ violate the EF1 condition (3) for the good g1, in particular, implies
v(Ah) − v(Aℓ) > v(g1). Since v(Ah) =
∑t
z=1 v(gz) and v(Aℓ) >
∑t
z=1 v(µ(gz)), we have∑t
z=1 (v(gz)− v(µ(gz))) > v(g1). An averaging argument ensures that there exists an index
x such that
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v(gx)− v(µ(gx)) >
1
t
v(g1)
≥
1
t2
v(Ah) (g1 is the highest valued good in Ah) (4)
Since t ≤ m, the selected pair (gx, µ(gx)) satisfies the required property v(gx) − v(µ(gx)) ≥
1
m2
v(Ah). Therefore,
v(Ah)− v(gx) + v(µ(gx)) <
(
1−
1
m2
)
v(Ah)
Lemma 5 ensures that the bundles (Ah \ {gx}) ∪ {µ(gx)} and (Aℓ \ {µ(gx)}) ∪ {gx} are in-
dependent. Hence, whenever |Ah| ≤ |Aℓ|, Algorithm 3 can swap goods between Ah and
Aℓ such that the bundles remain independent and the value of the bundle Ah drops by a
multiplicative factor of at least
(
1− 1
m2
)
.
Consider an iteration wherein the algorithm updates partition A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) ∈ M to
obtain partition A′ = (A′1, A2, . . . , A
′
n) ∈ M. This update decreases the valuation of the bundle
Ah and increases the valuation of Aℓ: v(A
′
h) < v(Ah) and v(A
′
ℓ) > v(Aℓ). For all the remaining
bundles the valuation remains unchanged: v(A′i) = v(Ai) for all i ∈ [n] \ {h, ℓ}.
Since Ah violates EF1 and the algorithms reallocates one good from Ah, we have v(A
′
h) ≥
v(Aℓ). Therefore,mini∈[n] v(A
′
i) ≥ mini∈[n] v(Ai). Using this observation and the fact that Aℓ is the
least valued bundle in A, we get that the algorithm’s update does not create new violators with
respect to the least valued bundle: V(A′) ⊆ V(A).
This containment ensures that if an index i is dropped from the violating set V(A) then it is
never included back in the set in any later iteration. Next we will show that an index can be the
highest valued bundle, i.e., h, in V(A) for at most a polynomial number of iterations. This, overall,
implies that the algorithm finds an EF1 allocation in polynomial time.
Note that every time an index i is selected as the highest valued bundle in V(A) either the
cardinality of Ai decreases by one or its valuation drops by a multiplicative factor of
(
1− 1
m2
)
.
Furthermore, while Ai continues to violate the EF1 condition with respect to the least valued
bundle its value cannot increase in an update (only the least valued bundle experiences an increase
in valuation). Hence, after i is selected as the highest valued bundle in the violating set, say,m2k+
m times, v(Ai) is at most
(
1− 1
m2
)m2 k
≤ 1
ek
times its initial value. Therefore, for a polynomially
large k, we get that any index i cannot be the highest valued bundle in the violating set more than
m2k +m times. Overall, this establishes that the algorithm terminates after a polynomial number
of iterations and the stated claim follows.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper extends the active line of work on fair division of indivisible goods and shows that
fairness guarantees are not lost by imposing cardinality constraints. In particular, we show that
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EF1 allocations are guaranteed to exist even under cardinality constraints. Note that, though the
round-robin method [CKM+16] and cycle-elimination algorithm [LMMS04] efficiently find EF1
allocations in the unconstrained setting, these algorithms can lead to an allocation which does not
satisfy the cardinality constraints. In this paperwe bypass this issue by combining the round-robin
method with envy graphs in an interesting manner.
The universality of EF1 is further strengthened by our result which shows that if the agents’
valuations are identical (and additive), then fair (EF1) allocations exist even under matroid con-
straints. Establishing such a guarantee—along with computational results—for heterogeneous
valuations (additive and beyond) remains an interesting direction of future work.13
We also show that, even under cardinality constraints, approximate maximin fair allocations
always exist and can be computed efficiently. This result is obtained by reducing the constrained
version of the problem (with additive valuations) to an unconstrained one (with submodular val-
uations). This reduction might be useful for addressing other constrained, fair division problems.
Going forward it would be quite relevant to study fair division, both unconstrained and con-
strained, among strategic agents.
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